Salary cuts and competitiveness by Haliassos, Michael
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Michael Haliassos, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
Salary Cuts and Competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
Policy Letter Series No. 1 
 1 
 
 
Salary Cuts and Competitiveness 
 
By Michael Haliassos 
Chair of Macroeconomics and Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt 
and Director of the Center for Financial Studies 
 
 
 
 
Promotion of competitiveness in the international market for goods and services, 
especially for fiscally troubled countries, is both  an objective  of European Union 
policies and a prerequisite for the longer-run viability and repayment of public debt. 
Massive horizontal salary cuts appear, at first,  to promote competitiveness by 
reducing unit labor costs and to reduce fiscal deficits by reducing the wage bill of the 
public sector. Upon closer look, however, horizontal salary cuts have been much 
greater than needed for Greek competitiveness, providing an alibi vis a vis the Troika 
for reforms that are still to be implemented, but at the same time undermining both 
competitiveness and the potential to reduce public debt through sustainable 
development. 
 
There is  a prevalent view outside Greece that promotion of competitiveness is 
tantamount with price reductions for Greek goods and services. Unit labor costs are 
the ratio of wage levels to productivity. In view of the long delays and limited 
willingness to implement reforms in Greece, foreign debtors promote and accept 
drastic salary reductions as a means of boosting productivity and reducing public 
spending.  Multiple reductions, however, are hard to attribute to restoration of 
competitiveness. Based on the Harmonized Competitiveness Index of the ECB with 
reference to unit labor costs, Greece was one of only three Eurozone countries to 
improve competitiveness relative to the first quarter of 1999, second only to Germany 
(Figure 1). Already by the end of 2011, it stood in the middle of Eurozone countries 
in terms of the change in the index, without the further wage cuts implemented in 
2012. Figure 1 shows the change in competitiveness since the first quarter of 1999 for 
every Eurozone country, in three different quarters: 2009Q4, when the Greek crisis 
broke out, in 2011Q4, and in 2012Q2. 
 
 
   2 
 
 
Figure 1 
Change in ECB Harmonized Competitiveness Index since 1999Q1 
Eurozone Countries, Based on Unit Labor Costs 
In three quarters: 2009Q4, 2011Q4, 2012Q2 
Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
 
 
In countries with a broad industrial sector, a recession often leads to a process of 
“creative destruction”, i.e. elimination of less productive units and increase in 
aggregate productivity. Based on this experience, one might presume that part of the 
reduction in Greek unit labor costs is mechanical, due to an overall increase in 
productivity rather than to salary cuts. However, person-based labor productivity in 
Greece has been falling continuously since 2008! (Figure 2) The reduction in 
aggregate demand did not lead to a proportional reduction in employment, and it is 
worth investigating whether the reduction in aggregate productivity was aggravated 
by closure or relocation of high-productivity companies. In any event, salary 
reductions were so extensive, that they dominated even the reduction in productivity, 
so as to lead to an improvement in measured competitiveness. 
 
The views of international lenders on necessary wage cuts are also influenced by the 
observation that Greece’s harmonized competitiveness index with reference to the 
Consumer Price Index continues to be lower than at the start of 1999, with Greece 
ranked in the middle of the Eurozone in terms of the size of the difference. However, 
taking into account the relatively small role of domestic producer prices in the level of 
the CPI (due to the limited productive base, the high share of imports, and the 
substantial indirect taxes), this ranking is more indicative of how attractive Greece is 
for locating a household rather than of how competitive the productive sector is. 
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Figure 2 
Labor Productivity Index (person based) 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
Large horizontal salary cuts hurt productivity and the country’s potential to create a 
broad and dynamic productive base focused on innovation and exports. Horizontal 
cuts lead to a reduction in expected productivity, because the best employees leave, 
the rest have fewer incentives to be productive, and promising new people become 
more difficult to attract. Current mass migration of young but also of experienced 
workers abroad is the result not only of unemployment but also of salary levels; it will 
continue as long as economic prospects remain bleak. Innovation, inventiveness, 
original thinking, and quality work are associated with people who have significant 
outside options in an increasingly globalized job market. 
 
Could it be that salary reductions will create an influx of foreign companies or a 
return of Greek ones? If so, why aren’t they already back? Beyond salary levels, 
important factors include ease of establishing and running businesses, investor 
protection, perceptions of public corruption, and labor relations. Greece ranks 78th in 
terms of the (revised) World Bank Index of Ease of Doing Business, 146th in ease of 
starting a business, and in 117th place in investor protection. In terms of the Perceived 
Corruption Index of Transparency International, Greece is ranked 94th, together with 
Djibouti, Colombia, and Senegal. Greek and foreign investors are unlikely to locate in 
Greece without sweeping reforms in public administration, labor policies, and the 
justice system. 
 
Boosting Greek competitiveness requires attracting dynamic companies and 
productive workers. Linking pay to productivity, improvements in university and 4 
 
technical education, substantial promotion of entrepreneurship, and encouragement of 
research and innovation should replace assaults on wages as measures to boost 
competitiveness. For example, R&D spending in Greece was mostly public and at 
around 0.5% of GDP prior to the crisis. The EU-27 average in 2009 was 2% and 
about two thirds of it were coming from the private sector.  
  
Refocusing EU policy towards closing gaps in those aspects has the potential to 
promote economic development and repayment potential for public debt. Mindless 
insistence on continual horizontal salary reductions simply drains Greece from its 
most promising scientists, entrepreneurs, and workers. 
 
 